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NOTE
Eliminating Financiers from the Equation:
A Call for Court-Mandated Fee Shifting
in Divorces
Bibeane Metsch-Garcia*
Divorce can be prohibitively costly. Many struggle or simply cannot afford to
pay divorce attorneys’ fees, and the economic effects of divorce on women are
particularly acute. In the past few years, financing firms have emerged to fund
nonmonied spouses, mostly women, who cannot afford to litigate divorces
from their wealthy spouses. The services provided come with a hefty price tag:
firms take large fees, and their involvement may lead to unethical and poten-
tially damaging practices. This Note explains what third-party divorce finance
firms are and why the use of firms is problematic, and offers an alternative,
more equitable method of financing nonmonied spouses’ divorce fees. Courts,
not financing firms, should address any disparities in ability to pay between
spouses. Mandatory fee shifting by courts would obviate the need for these
financing firms that improperly profit from divorce and whose services come
with many unwelcome strings attached.
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Introduction
Divorce traditionally involves two spouses, their attorneys, a judge, and
perhaps children. But today, in some cases, the drama involves a new party:
a divorce-financing firm. Since 2009, these firms have been investing1 or
loaning money at high rates2 to spouses, mostly women,3 to finance di-
vorces. Traditional forms of funding (e.g., a standard bank loan) are often
not an option for an individual whose spouse controlled the finances during
the marriage and who often has no income, low credit, and little or no
available collateral.4 In addition to often having difficulty paying to litigate a
divorce, women typically experience a severe decline in economic standing
after a divorce.5
The media portrays third-party financing firms as saviors for those who
cannot otherwise afford to pay for their divorce litigation. For example, re-
porters have dubbed one such firm and its leading attorney the “Robin
1. See Balance Point Divorce Funding, http://www.balancepointfunding.com (last
visited Jan. 23, 2015).
2. Bridget Mallon, Divorce Settlements: The ‘Divorce Fixer’ Provides Loans to Divorce´s,
Huffington Post (July 9, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/di-
vorce-settlements_n_3568689.html (stating that one firm typically collects between 12 to 20
percent interest on loans).
3. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Taking Sides in a Divorce, Chasing Profit, N.Y. Times, Dec.
5, 2010, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/business/05divorce.html
(“[C]ustomers fall into a pattern. They are women. They generally do not have jobs. They
often are raising small children. And their husbands run their own businesses, making it tough
to obtain financial information.”); Paul Sullivan, Divorce Funding Firms Help Spouses Expecting
Big Payouts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2015, at B4, available at http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/02/
28/your-money/divorce-funding-firms-help-spouses-expecting-big-payouts.html?referrer=&_
r=1.
4. See Stephanie Taylor Christensen, What Are Divorce Loans?, MintLife Blog (Mar.
29, 2013), https://www.mint.com/blog/trends/what-are-divorce-loans-0313 (“Credit is often a
key concern in a divorce, especially when one spouse managed most of the household finances,
held financial accounts in his or her name, and served as the primary breadwinner. Likewise,
when one spouse hides or moves assets, or threatens to default on shared loans and mortgages,
even divorcees with plenty of income and previously stellar credit may find themselves unable
to secure loans and lines of credit in the midst of divorce proceedings.”).
5. Karen Winner, Divorced from Justice: The Abuse of Women and Children by
Divorce Lawyers and Judges xvii (1996) (“[N]ewly divorced women find that their standard
of living has plummeted, on the average, by 30 percent, and mothers’ and children’s available
income has fallen as much as 37 percent. Meanwhile, the standard of living for their ex-
husbands has risen from 10 to 15 percent.”); see also Terry Arendell, Mothers & Divorce
36–37 (1986) (summarizing economic impact of divorce for sixty interview subjects).
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Hood for divorcing women,”6 “the fairy godmother for Manhattan
divorce´es,”7 and the “divorce fixer.”8 The nonmonied spouse seeking financ-
ing for her divorce is typically a woman whose husband controlled the fi-
nances, perhaps gave her an allowance, and generally funded her lifestyle by
making mortgage and credit card payments and meeting other financial ob-
ligations.9 Divorces themselves are complex and expensive. In addition to
attorneys’ fees, spouses often pay for outside experts and investigators10 to
analyze a spouse’s questionable behavior and value the monied spouse’s bus-
iness, real estate, stocks, and other assets,11 resulting in a lengthy discovery
process.
The media and scholars have not probed deeply into the ethics and eco-
nomics of this growing practice to consider if more cost-effective and mor-
ally sound alternatives exist for potential clients of these firms.12 Third-party
divorce funding is distinct from traditional bank loans and credit cards for
the following reasons: the financing firm is more involved in the outcome
than a bank would be; there are moral implications of the firm explicitly
profiting from divorce; and finally, divorce settlement is the only source of
repayment. Unlike traditional loans where banks are repaid as long as their
clients secure funding, divorce settlements are the only collateral for the third-
6. Julia Marsh, Divorce ‘Fixer’ for Hire ‘Lending’ Soon-to-Be Ex-Wives a Hand, N.Y.
Post, July 8, 2013, at 9, available at http://nypost.com/2013/07/08/new-yorks-divorce-fixer-
helps-soon-to-be-ex-wives-fight-for-big-settlements (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id.
8. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. See Christensen, supra note 4; Good Morning America: ‘Fairy Godmother’ ‘Levels’ Fi-
nancial Playing Field for Divorces (ABC television broadcast July 9, 2013), available at http://
abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/divorce-fairy-godmother-nicole-noonan-levels-financial-play-
ing-19614937 (“My ex-husband controlled all of our marital finances . . . and it wasn’t until
we started the divorce proceedings and the bills started piling up where I realized how power-
less I was.”).
10. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 237(a)(6) (McKinney 2010). New York law on attorney’s
fees in divorce cases explicitly contemplates the use of experts. See also Appelbaum, supra note
3; Jeff Landers, Four Reasons Why a Woman Needs a Vocational Expert on Her Divorce Team,
Forbes (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2012/10/24/four-
reasons-why-a-woman-needs-a-vocational-expert-on-her-divorce-team (discussing the differ-
ent types of experts women seeking divorces use).
11. Winner, supra note 5, at 40. Financing firms only accept clients whose spouses have
considerable assets. The monied spouses relevant to this Note are therefore more likely to have
the sorts of complex or hidden assets requiring experts and investigators. See infra note 32 and
accompanying text.
12. See supra notes 6–8; cf. Kingston White, Note, A Call for Regulating Third-Party Di-
vorce Litigation Funding, 13 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 395, 396 (2011) (“[N]egative effects . . . are
likely to occur with the continuation of unregulated divorce funding, including an increase in
the quantity and cost of divorce proceedings, a heavier burden on society as a result of the
increased number of divorces, and lenders influencing the litigation inappropriately and en-
couraging more spending than necessary. . . . [This Note] proposes a two-front solution, fo-
cusing on a call to action by state legislatures to regulate divorce funding to prevent harmful
effects that will almost undoubtedly arise if left unchecked.”).
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party financing firms, so these firms are more invested in the strategy of how
money is spent and the goal of finalizing divorces.13
Third-party firms finance nonmonied spouses either through nonre-
course loans or through an investment-like funding. Either of these funding
arrangements, regardless of the nominal label given or the specifics of the
arrangement, resemble a contingency fee arrangement when repaid in the
event of a divorce settlement. This is problematic because contingency fee
arrangements in which “[a] fee [is] charged for a lawyer’s services only if the
lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court”14 have long been
banned in divorce cases.15 Some firms give nonrecourse16 loans whose terms
explicitly tie repayment to the finalization and settlement of the divorce.17
Other firms provide funding in a more traditional investment form and are
repaid a percentage of any settlement.18 In either case, firms are repaid from
the divorce settlement, so firms may discourage clients from reconciling or
reaching a compromise that the firms view as financially unfavorable.19
Firms often charge steep rates, particularly in comparison to shifting fees,
the much more economically efficient service courts can provide. Although
inability to pay is a serious obstacle for many, given courts’ ability to award
fees to a nonmonied spouse,20 third-party divorce funding is not an appro-
priate or equitable option and should be banned.
13. After a client’s loan is approved, one firm receives monthly invoices from the client’s
attorney and then contacts the client for approval before paying the attorney as well as “under-
take[s] a quarterly review of [the] loan to ensure [the] case remains on track.” FAQs for Bor-
rowers, BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., http://www.bblchurchill.com/borrowers/faq (last
visited Jan. 23, 2015).
14. Black’s Law Dictionary 387 (10th ed. 2014).
15. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.5(d)(1) (2014); 23 Samuel Williston &
Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 62:4, at 298 (4th ed. 2002) (“A
contingent fee agreement between an attorney and client, which has for its purpose the pro-
curing of a divorce, is not valid and will not be enforced.”); see also infra note 112 and accom-
panying text (discussing why contingency fees are banned in the divorce context).
16. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 14, at 1220 (“Of, relating to, or involving an
obligation that can be satisfied only out of the collateral securing the obligation [the divorce
settlement] and not out of the debtor’s other assets.”).
17. E.g., Divorce Funding, Anglo-Am. Legal Fin. Group, http://www.aalfg.com/divorce-
funding.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
18. E.g., Our Approach, Balance Point Divorce Funding, http://www.balance-
pointfunding.com/approach.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
19. For an example of a divorce finance firm executive describing an incentive to maxi-
mize settlements, see Christensen, supra note 4: “Thanks to [the firm’s] underwriting exper-
tise . . . a client has never gotten less than an expected settlement, and [the firm] has never
been left holding the bag for a loan.”
20. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining how courts in Illinois deter-
mine whether inability to pay for the costs of divorce has been demonstrated and fees should
be awarded).
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Although regulation of this burgeoning industry may be tempting, it is
not ideal. Providing oversight or transparency is unlikely to offset the eco-
nomic inefficiency of adding a fifth party (in addition to the two spouses
and their attorneys) to split the settlement and costs of litigation with. Regu-
lation also cannot wash away the moral implications of a business model
that condones capitalizing on the dissolution of individuals’ marriages.
Loans are already subject to usury regulations,21 but the caps on interest
rates have no effect on firms’ heightened involvement in the litigation strat-
egy and laser focus on finalizing a divorce for financial gain.22 More strin-
gent regulations may also drive these firms out of business without
providing an alternative, leaving nonmonied spouses with no other option
and unable to pay for their divorces.23 For these reasons, court involvement
through fee shifting provides a more comprehensive and equitable
alternative.
This Note contends that third-party financing firms should be banned,
and that courts should step in and order mandatory fee shifting to finance
nonmonied spouses’ divorce expenses. Part I provides background on this
financing arrangement in the divorce context. Part II argues that third-party
funding should be prohibited because it resembles contingency fee arrange-
ments in divorces, banned because they may cause conflicts of interest, lead
to waiver of the attorney-client privilege,24 and result in disproportionate
windfalls for attorneys because of the high rates they charge. Part III con-
tends that the optimal way to deal with a spouse’s inability to pay the astro-
nomical costs of litigating a divorce is mandatory fee shifting by courts from
the monied to the nonmonied spouse. The shifting of fees may be from the
marital assets or the monied spouse’s own finances. While the fees shifted
may come out of the marital assets to be split by the spouses, at most the
nonmonied spouse will bear 50 percent of the burden of her fees. In con-
trast, if a nonmonied spouse were financed by a third-party firm, she would
be responsible for 100 percent of the fees arising from her settlement.
I. Third-Party Funding of Divorce Litigation
A. Financing Basics
Divorce financing has emerged as a niche service in the larger industry
of third-party litigation funding, which has received significant attention
21. See infra text accompanying notes 89–90.
22. See infra text accompanying note 62; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. Whether communication between firms and their clients is privileged is currently
being litigated in the Southern District of New York in a case involving SAC Capital Advisors
founder Steven A. Cohen and his ex-wife Patricia Cohen. See Matthew Goldstein, Outside
Financing for Ex-Wife’s Feud, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2014, at B1, available at http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2014/11/25/steven-cohens-ex-wife-gets-outside-financing-for-lawsuit/.
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from scholars,25 advocacy groups,26 and mass media.27 But third-party fi-
nancing has received little scrutiny in the divorce context, and not much is
known about how the practice works. Unique treatment of divorce in the
law is necessary because of the highly emotional and personal nature of
divorce.
The process works like this: firms such as California’s Balance Point Di-
vorce Funding28 and New York’s BBL Churchill29 front the costs for legal
fees, fraud and asset investigators, and sometimes even living expenses.30
These firms describe such funding as a “financial lifeline”31 to cover the sky-
high costs of litigating dissolution of the marriage.32 But in reality, these
firms exclusively invest in divorces, in the form of a loan or investment, of
clients with high-net-worth spouses.33 While firms are not yet financing di-
vorces on a mass scale, these investments will likely become more common
25. E.g., Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party
Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 645, 672 (2012)
(finding that third-party financing will likely increase the amount of litigation); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 593,
596 (2012) (“[T]hird-party financing is increasing inefficiency and threatening both the com-
pensatory and deterrent functions of the legal system.”).
26. E.g., U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble:
Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United States (2009), available at http://
ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf.
27. E.g., David Stevenson, Perfectly Legal Funding Opportunities, Fin. Times (London),
Nov. 3, 2012, at 6, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d8eca56-2346-11e2-a46b-
00144feabdc0.html; William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them,
N.Y. Times Dealbook Blog (Apr. 30, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/
30/looking-to-make-a-profit-on-lawsuits-firms-invest-in-them; Bradley T. Borden, Third-
Party Litigation Financing and the Impending Resurgence of the Legal Profession, Huffington
Post (May 4, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-t-borden/thirdparty-
litigation-fin_b_3201167.html.
28. Balance Point Divorce Funding, supra note 1.
29. BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., http://www.bblchurchill.com/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2015).
30. About, Balance Point Divorce Funding, http://www.balancepointfunding.com/
about.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); Good Morning America: ‘Fairy Godmother’ ‘Levels’ Fi-
nancial Playing Field for Divorces, supra note 9; Brendan Lyle, Finding Your Ex’s Hidden Assets,
Huffington Post (Jul. 12, 2012, 3:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brendan-lyle/
finding-your-exs-hidden-a_b_1660142.html.
31. Good Morning America: ‘Fairy Godmother’ ‘Levels’ Financial Playing Field for Divorces,
supra note 9.
32. Winner, supra note 5, at 38–40. The cost of divorce varies based on whether the
divorce is contested, the issues being litigated, and the size of the estate. In a contested divorce,
the discovery process involving experts valuing the other spouse’s assets including stocks,
bonds, real estate, pension funds, and businesses can be quite expensive. Id. at 40 (“If a
[spouse] chooses to conceal assets, the discovery process can be dragged out for years, [the]
lawyer charging fees every step of the way, in the effort to collect and assess financial informa-
tion from [the opposing side].”).
33. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 3 (reporting that Balance Point Divorce Funding,
one of the pioneers in this industry, loans an average of over $200,000 to clients whose marital
assets total between $2 million and $15 million).
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in high-net-worth divorces because this industry is lucrative and divorce
rates are high.
These firms fall into two financing models: those that make invest-
ments34 and those that provide loans at a fixed interest rate.35 Some invest-
ments and loans are nonrecourse.36 Irrespective of the label placed on the
funding and the particularities of the financing arrangement, funding a di-
vorce for the sole purpose of receiving a portion of the divorce settlement is
problematic.37 Both contingency fees and third-party financing are inappro-
priate in the divorce context because lawyers and firms in both scenarios
have a financial interest in the divorce, may be biased in favor of reaching a
settlement to ensure that they are paid, and may dissuade their clients from
reconciling.38
B. The Process of Becoming a Client
A shroud of mystery surrounds the application process and how firms
assess risks, choose clients, and decide what rates to charge. Some firms al-
low potential clients to come to them with or without an attorney.39 The
applicant then proposes a budget that the firm analyzes.40 Firms use many
criteria to assess the likely payout from investing in a particular divorce liti-
gant.41 A firm may place funding into an escrow account while the divorce is
pending.42 A client can access this escrow account, and the firm cannot dis-
perse any funds for attorney’s fees or other payments from this account ab-
sent the client’s approval.43 The firm may require the client to account for
how money is being spent and update the firm on the status of the case.44
These financing models greatly resemble contingency fees because they
are nonrecourse, meaning repayment is dependent on reaching a divorce
settlement. A firm only makes money if a client makes money, and the col-
lateral for the investment is the divorce settlement. In the end, firms may
take a percentage of the settlement based on a sliding scale that considers the
34. See, e.g., Our Approach, Balance Point Divorce Funding, supra note 18.
35. FAQs for Borrowers, BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., supra note 13.
36. E.g., Divorce Funding, Anglo-Am. Legal Fin. Group, supra note 17.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
39. Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, Founder & CEO, Balance Point Divorce
Funding (Oct. 9, 2013).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., BBL Churchill Grp., Inc., Brochure for Attorneys 2 (n.d.), available at
http://www.bblchurchill.com/attorneys/new_attorneys.pdf (“Churchill considers the following
factors in the underwriting process: 1. The joint net asset pool of the relationship. 2. Likely
split of the assets between the parties. 3. Expected time until settlement. 4. Whether any offers
have been made. 5. What the funding will be used for (legal fees, living expenses). 6.
[Whether] the client changed attorneys or [has] been self-represented previously[.]”).
42. Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. See FAQs for Borrowers, BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., supra note 13.
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amount of money spent by a client and the size of the award granted.45 The
long-standing ban on contingency fees in divorces and the mechanics of the
financing relationship in both the contingency fee and third-party financing
contexts make the comparison apt. The similarities between contingency
fees and third-party financing illustrate why financing firms are particularly
problematic in the divorce context—both arrangements tend to create fric-
tion in the attorney-client relationship, give rise to conflicts of interest, and
lead to attorneys charging unreasonable rates.
II. The Law Should Ban Third-Party Investments in Divorce
Regulating financing firms is not the ideal approach. Even though regu-
lation is possible,46 the more equitable, cost-efficient, and administrable ap-
proach is for courts to handle disparities in ability to pay. Courts’
intervention saves clients from firms taking disproportionately large por-
tions of their settlements.47 Congress often fails to pass legislation that is
protective of women’s rights, and state legislators may not have the political
willpower to pass these regulations.48 For these reasons, rather than limiting
rates, requiring disclosures about the use of firms to courts, or implement-
ing other Band-Aid regulations, third-party investments in divorce should
be banned. Section II.A argues that third-party financing resembles contin-
gency fees, which are prohibited in divorces because a contingency fee ar-
rangement can give rise to conflicts of interest, exacerbate the danger of
exerting undue influence on vulnerable clients, and cause waiver of the at-
torney-client privilege. Section II.B contends that the rates charged by fi-
nancing firms can be unreasonable. Section II.C illustrates how repayment
to a firm from a much-needed settlement award is detrimental to clients.
Contrary to the media’s portrayal of firms as saviors, firms can impose a
heavy burden on already overwhelmed clients.
A. Investments Can Jeopardize Attorney-Client Relations
The ban on contingency fees in divorce litigation is in part based on the
risk that attorneys with a financial stake in a settlement may tend to disfavor
45. Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, supra note 39.
46. For a Note advocating for regulation see White, supra note 12.
47. See infra Section III.D.
48. See, e.g., Erika Eichelberger, GOP Blocks VAWA, Nation, Jan. 21, 2013, at 6, available
at http://www.thenation.com/article/171977/gop-blocks-vawa; David S. Joachim, G.O.P. Sena-
tors Block Pay Gap Legislation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2014, at A14, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-bill-on-equal-pay.html. Some
states such as Texas and Massachusetts have, or are contemplating passing, legislation to de-
crease the amount of alimony awarded. Jeff Landers, In Many States, Alimony Reform Has Gone
Too Far, Forbes (July 12, 2011, 10:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2011/07/
12/in-many-states-alimony-reform-has-gone-too-far/ (discussing alimony reforms’ detrimen-
tal effects on women).
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reconciliation and exert pressure on vulnerable clients.49 Similar concerns
arise when firms make nonrecourse investments in divorce: the interests of
financiers animated by their bottom line may not be in sync with the inter-
ests of a client. For example, if a client decides to reconcile, the firm will not
recoup a return on the investment, losing time and resources. Thus, the
firm’s financial interest in a possible settlement award may create a conflict
of interest when a firm inappropriately dissuades a client from reconciling.50
A firm may also exert undue pressure by actively influencing decisions51 that
impact the outcome of the litigation, such as what bargaining strategies to
use, what motions to file, and how cooperative to be.
A financing firm is a business entity with an interest in making a profit.
A financing firm may therefore subvert a client’s wishes in favor of ensuring
repayment. There are rules in place to deal with the danger of attorneys
exerting undue influence on clients. But the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not apply to financing firms,52 nor do the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence concerning attorney-client privilege.53 The dangers of conflicts of in-
terest and undue influence are heightened in the divorce context because
clients are downtrodden and vulnerable.54 Divorce can be one of the most
traumatic and difficult events in an individual’s lifetime.55 For this reason,
scholars have observed, “[d]ivorce clients are typically the weaker parties in
49. Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics § 1.5-3(b), at 185
(2014-2015 ed. 2014) (“Contingent fees by their nature raise potential conflicts of interest
between the attorney and client. For example, the client may wish to settle litigation while the
attorney would want to press on, or vice-versa.” (footnote omitted)); see also 23 Williston &
Lord, supra note 15, § 62:4, at 298–99 (“[C]ontingent fee arrangements . . . [in] divorce
proceedings . . . have a tendency to prevent the reconciliation of the parties.”).
50. Most clients who seek a divorce and use the services of funding firms do not wish to
reconcile. See Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, supra note 39 (noting that none of her
clients have reconciled). Due to this reality, financing firms likely do not incentivize divorce;
however, one can infer that a firm has an incentive to dissuade clients from reconciling due to
the firm’s financial interest in a possible settlement.
51. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 44.
52. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. & scope (2014) (describing the scope of
the rules as applied to lawyers and the legal profession).
53. Fed. R. Evid. 502 (“The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to
disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection.” (emphasis added)).
54. See Barrelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (“Wives contemplat-
ing divorce are often distraught and without experience in negotiating contracts. Should con-
tingent fee contracts between them and the attorneys they employ under such conditions
become the usual fee arrangement, charges of overreaching and undue influence will be all too
frequent.”); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients
42 (1995) (“[Lawyers counsel] clients that people in the throes of a divorce are particularly
vulnerable to stress and emotion. They suggest that clients ought to be suspicious of their own
judgment and, by implying that such judgment is likely to be unreliable, lawyers highlight the
importance of depending on them for sound guidance.”).
55. Arendell, supra note 5, at 3 (“In national studies that examine people’s views on life
experiences, divorce has consistently been ranked second among forty-two stressful life
events.”).
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their relationship with their lawyers.”56 This power dynamic stems from the
differential positions of the lawyer and client, specifically the “entrenched
position of lawyers—their turf, their rules, their vernacular—and the en-
hanced vulnerability of clients—high stakes, high affect [sic], and inade-
quate resources.”57
Firms, by virtue of needing the attorney’s assessment of a case and pro-
viding payment for the attorney’s services, create an environment that may
lead an attorney to compromise her obligation to her client and more gener-
ally the ethics of the legal profession. Of course, attorneys are ethically
bound to represent their clients’ best interests,58 but financing firms add one
more weight to the scale, tipping attorneys toward a gray area where they
might impermissibly place a financing firm’s interest ahead of their clients’
interests.
As discussed earlier, an attorney may not take a divorce case on a con-
tingency fee basis.59 If an attorney’s client is working with a financing firm,
the attorney is facilitating the financing of the divorce on a contingency fee
basis and the attorney is eventually paid through this arrangement, albeit
indirectly. This is problematic because attorneys may not facilitate the ac-
tions of other parties that conflict with an attorney’s obligations under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.60 Use of such a loophole is one of
several ethical issues that may arise when third-party financing firms are
involved. Third-party investments in divorce increase the already existing
tension between a lawyer’s desire to serve a client’s needs and her need to
make a profit.61
1. Conflicts of Interest
Divorce-financing firms’ involvement could create confusion regarding
whom the attorney is working for and may lead to conflicts of interest. The
56. See, e.g., Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 54, at 83 (providing a window into the
divorce attorney-client relationship based on the authors’ observations of actual meetings be-
tween divorce attorneys and their clients).
57. Id. at 84.
58. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. & scope, at para. 9 (2014) (“[The]
principles [underlying the Rules] include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pur-
sue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a profes-
sional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.” (emphasis
added)).
59. See supra notes 15, 49 and accompanying text.
60. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist
or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” (emphasis added)).
61. See Lynn Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work 133 (2001) (“The ideology of
legal professionalism includes a commitment to altruism. The realities of practice, however,
place limits on selflessness. Scholars of the professions see as a core problem of professional
practice ‘the tension between the provision of affordable and conscientious service to others,
and the economic interest of those who provide it.’ ” (quoting Eliot Freidson, Profession-
alism Reborn 199 (1994))).
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third-party financing arrangement raises ethical issues because an attorney
has an ethical obligation to her client, not to a third party. This line becomes
blurred when the financing firm is substantially involved in the litigation
strategy and is the financial power driving the attorney-client relationship.62
In general, third-party litigation funding has been criticized because of this
tendency to “create confusion concerning the party who controls the lawsuit
and concerning the attorney-client relationship.”63 Given the delicate nature
of divorces and the potential to profit from the dissolution of a marriage,
third-party involvement can heighten the danger that a client’s interests will
be subverted.
In addition to the risk that financing firms and attorneys may disincen-
tivize reconciliation,64 financier and client interests can diverge in several
other ways. For example, clients may want to make certain strategic deci-
sions that the firm disagrees with, or may decide to concede valuable assets
that the financing firm would be interested in receiving a portion of. Pay-
ment of attorney’s fees by third-party investors can cause confusion for the
attorney as to who the client is, and whose needs the attorney should be
serving.65 Some financing firms clear attorneys’ billed hours with clients
before paying attorneys.66 This involvement dilutes the extent to which the
attorney can focus on the client’s needs because she has to be responsive to a
new party.
Financing firms’ payments to lawyers may also violate the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. These rules mandate that lawyers may only accept
compensation for representing a client from someone other than a client if
“(1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6.”67 In the divorce context, involving a fi-
nancing firm in decisionmaking undermines the lawyer’s ability to make
independent judgments, favorable to her client, about how to proceed.
“Since the . . . company pays the attorney’s fee and are [sic] in a position to
provide future business, there is an ever-present danger that a lawyer will
subordinate his duties to the [client] to pander to the [financiers].”68 There-
fore, when a third-party financier becomes involved there is serious poten-
tial that the client’s best interests will become secondary to those of the
financing firm or the client’s attorney.
62. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
63. Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party
Litigation Funding, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 343, 367 (2011).
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. See John W. Toothman & William G. Ross, Legal Fees 121–23 (2003) (discussing
the concept of a “fee triangle” that is created when the third party becomes involved).
66. See supra note 13.
67. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.8(f) (2014).
68. Toothman & Ross, supra note 65, at 122 (discussing triangle-fee arrangements in
the insurance context).
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2. Compromising Attorney-Client Privilege
Another problem that can arise when a third-party financier is involved
is waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The dynamics between a firm and a
client differ from the dynamics between a client and a bank giving out a
traditional loan. Unlike the financing provided by a firm, a bank’s loan is
subject to usury laws69 and is recourse (and therefore repayment is not con-
tingent on a settlement being reached). When individuals seek bank loans,
they are not required to discuss the likelihood of their success in securing a
divorce settlement or other litigation strategies—the bank is not interested.
A bank has far less incentive to be involved in the details of how a client uses
money or her legal strategy, because she will repay the loan regardless of the
outcome. Funding firms, on the other hand, must do due diligence on the
merits of the case to ensure that a potential client has significant marital
assets, and these firms often have significant oversight over the litigation.70
In order to assess the risks and benefits of working with a potential client, a
firm may try to speak to a client’s attorney.
These discussions between a third-party firm and a client’s attorney can
lead to an involuntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, which is pro-
tected by common law and state rules of evidence. Some divorce-financing
firms require applicants to consent to the firm contacting their attorneys.
For example, one firm’s application for funding requires clients to sign the
following statement: “I hereby authorize and instruct my attorney to provide
BBL Churchill with all reasonable information required in order to assess
this application.”71 It is unclear what constitutes “all reasonable informa-
tion” or whether the firm apprises clients of the potential effects of signing
such an agreement. But the communications authorized by such agreements
are likely to lead to disclosure of an attorney’s strategy and a client’s likeli-
hood of success because that is what firms are interested in learning, result-
ing in a waiver of attorney-client privilege. Although divorce attorneys use
other types of consultants, such as psychologists, accountants, and private
mediators, attorneys do not typically divulge the likelihood of success and
general legal strategy to these individuals. In contrast, firms considering in-
vesting in divorce cases are interested in strategy and the merits of the case,
rather than a narrow topic such as any fraud committed by one of the
spouses. The type of information disclosed to financing firms may thus be
more likely to cover privileged information.
Such a waiver of attorney-client privilege can have significant, negative
ramifications for clients. This type of disclosure, which may result in an
attorney revealing his or her strategy, can seriously impact a client’s odds of
69. See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., FAQs for Borrowers, BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., supra note 13 (“Churc-
hill will also undertake a quarterly review of your loan to ensure your case remains on track.”).
71. BBL Churchill Divorce Finance, Application Form (n.d.), available at http://
www.bblchurchill.com/download/BBL_Application-Form.pdf.
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success. Clients seeking a divorce are often “distraught and without experi-
ence in negotiating contracts” and dealing with attorneys.72 As a result,
many clients are probably unaware of the existence of attorney-client privi-
lege altogether,73 let alone the repercussions of waiver.74 While some attor-
neys may advise their clients well and warn them about waiving attorney-
client privilege, not all practitioners will properly advise their clients. Even
well-meaning attorneys may not be able to shield a client who, without her
attorney’s knowledge, speaks with a third-party firm about the case and
strategy, thereby waiving the privilege. Although extending the attorney-cli-
ent privilege rules to cover third-party financing firms is tempting, such reg-
ulation is not a viable solution because the law involving third parties is
muddled and unsettled.75 Extending privilege “may be justified only if there
is a transcendent public good that outweighs the search for truth.”76
B. Divorce-Financing Fees Are Unreasonable and Potentially Usurious
In addition to the ethical problems, the fees charged by divorce-financ-
ing firms are themselves often unreasonable and morally questionable. Con-
tingency fees and third-party financing are two arrangements in which
another party profits from a divorce, a private and highly personal matter.
This reality makes contingency fees and third-party financing in divorces
72. See Barrelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (finding contingency
fee contracts for wives seeking divorce void as contrary to public policy).
73. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Impli-
cations for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1232 (1962) (“[M]ost
people were either unaware of the attorney-client privilege or believed that it extended to other
professional relationships as well.”).
74. See 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 325 (2004) (“[The attorney-client privilege] protects
disclosures that a client makes to his or her attorney, in confidence, for the purpose of secur-
ing legal advice or assistance.”); id. § 334 (“[I]nformation subject to the attorney-client privi-
lege retains its privileged character until a client has consented to its disclosure.”).
75. See 1 Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 4:36, at
518–20 (2012 ed. 2012) (“There is no clear standard for measuring the community of interests
that must exist for the [attorney-client] privilege to apply. Although courts have spoken gener-
ally of ‘common issues,’ these cases, for the most part, have involved situations where the
participants were actual or potential coparties in litigation. In these instances, the rule has
been denoted the ‘joint defense’ rule. When coparties are in the midst of or preparing for
litigation through a joint defense strategy, courts have virtually assumed (without focusing on
the nature of each party’s interests and how they might diverge) that a sufficient community of
interests exists, because of the common positions in the litigation, to justify the sharing of
otherwise privileged communications without that disclosure constituting a waiver of the priv-
ilege.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally The Attorney-Client Privilege in Civil Litiga-
tion: Protecting and Defending Confidentiality (Vincent S. Walkowiak et al. eds., 5th
ed. 2012) (describing various types of communications and related privilege protections).
76. Ronald Goldfarb, In Confidence: When to Protect Secrecy and When to
Require Disclosure 32 (2009) (“In considering the evolution of new privileges, the federal
courts are conservative, as they should be, about condoning impediments to the judicial
process.”).
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problematic. The law requires that contingency fees be reasonable in all con-
texts.77 Despite this requirement, contingency fees in practice tend to be ex-
cessive and “disproportionate to the effort required to secure the favorable
outcome.”78
Firms ought to be compensated to a reasonable extent for the liability
that they take on, yet they receive a disproportionate windfall. The fees
charged by firms may not be commensurate to the limited risk the firms
take in providing funding.79 That a client gets a large settlement in a divorce
does not mean that the attorney, or the financing firm, worked extremely
hard or was creative. For example, in the context of property settlements, the
nature of equitable division of property regimes often results in a client be-
ing awarded half of the property in an estate, irrespective of the amount of
work done by either her attorney or the firm.80 The fees of the firm that are
paid in a contingency-like manner may not have anything to do with the
amount or quality of work that went into a case. And even though propo-
nents may argue that no work would be done at all if nonmonied spouses
did not have the funding to hire a divorce attorney in the first instance,
other, more cost-effective alternatives exist, making this financing scheme
inequitable, inefficient, and unnecessarily costly.81
The inequity and inefficiency is especially acute if the firm uses a sliding
scale for payment where the rate charged rises as the size of the settlement
increases.82 Current regimes for regulating contingency fees, where they are
allowed in other contexts, require the opposite payment scheme.83 The fi-
nancing firm’s “contribution” makes it a five-way division of the
77. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.5(a) (2014).
78. In re Cooper, 344 S.E.2d 27, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
79. For example, if a firm provides a loan of $200,000 to a client who ultimately receives
a home worth $1,000,000 in a settlement through the equitable division of the property, see
infra notes 80, 103–106 and accompanying text, and the rate charged for the investment is 30
percent, the firm gets back the $200,000 plus $300,000 for a division of the property assets
with little risk involved.
80. See Douglas E. Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law 474 (3d ed. 2012)
(defining equitable division of property regimes as those in which each spouse is entitled to a
fair share of property acquired during the marriage, regardless of how the property is titled);
supra note 79; infra note 104.
81. See infra Part III.
82. See supra text accompanying note 45.
83. In the states with caps on contingency fees in the personal injury and medical mal-
practice contexts, fees are based on a sliding scale system under which the maximum percent-
age that can be charged decreases as the award increases. E.g., N.Y. Judiciary Law § 474-a
(McKinney 2005). (“[A] contingent fee in a medical, dental or podiatric malpractice action
shall not exceed . . . 30 percent of the first $250,000 of the sum recovered; 25 percent of the
next $250,000 of the sum recovered; 20 percent of the next $500,000 of the sum recovered; 15
percent of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered; 10 percent of any amount over $1,250,000
of the sum recovered.”); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 806.13 (2014) (“In any claim
or action for personal injury or wrongful death . . . in which the compensation of claimant’s
or plaintiff’s attorney is contingent . . . (1) 50% of the first $1,000 of the sum recovered, (2)
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nonmonied spouse’s financial pie, and the firms often take a large slice.84
Firms may receive an undeserved windfall by taking a huge percentage of the
eventual settlement, capitalizing on a divorcing spouse’s misfortune and vul-
nerability. Since there is no requirement to disclose the use of a financing
firm or the resulting fee arrangement to the court,85 there is no trans-
parency, oversight, or court evaluation of the reasonableness of fees charged,
as there would be with judicial fee shifting.86
It is difficult to determine how reasonable the fees charged by firms are
because there are no published standard rates for this particular industry.
Regulations capping some types of funding provide a barometer for reason-
ableness, but not all of the financing instruments used by firms are subject
to regulation. A loan is subject to state usury laws that limit the rate of
interest that may be charged.87 By contrast, the ultimate value of an invest-
ment—the investor’s recovery—is not limited by state law. This is problem-
atic because of the high rates charged by these firms.88 Financing firms’
investments are not subject to usury laws despite the high returns—even
though usury laws are specifically enacted to protect individuals from high
loan rates.89 Many jurisdictions have usury laws that prohibit excessive inter-
est.90 There are four elements of usury: “a loan or forbearance, interest ex-
ceeding the statutory maximum, absolute repayability of loan and interest,
and a lender with a willful intent to enter into a usurious transaction.”91 The
40% on the next $2,000 of the sum recovered, (3) 35% on the next $22,000 of the sum recov-
ered, (4) 25% on any amount over $25,000 of the sum recovered [shall be deemed
reasonable].”).
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. Cf. Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, supra note 39 (stating that her firm does
not require clients to disclose their working with the firm to the court, as this decision is left to
her clients).
86. For example, Ms. Napp would not reveal her sliding scale of percentages charged, see
infra note 93 and accompanying text, and there is no information available to the public
regarding how the firm’s payments are calculated.
87. See, e.g., FAQs for Borrowers, BBL Churchill Divorce Fin., supra note 13 (“Q: Is
BBL Churchill governed by any regulations? A: Yes. Unlike many lenders in the legal industry,
BBL Churchill complies with each State’s usury cap.”); see also infra note 91.
88. See infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Senate Democrats Crack Down on
Excessive Interest Rates and Fees (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=0bb9dfb6-aa7d-4120-a174-5a007674f499 (“The [proposed]
bill would create an interest rate and fee cap of 36% for all consumer credit transactions,
putting an end to the excessive rates which can top 300%.”).
90. 9 Williston & Lord, supra note 15, § 20:1.
91. 44B Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 81 (2007). For an example of a statutory maxi-
mum, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1916-1 (West 2010) (“The rate of interest upon the loan or for-
bearance of any money, goods or things in action or on accounts after demand or judgments
rendered in any court of this state, shall be seven dollars upon the one hundred dollars for one
year and at that rate for a greater or less sum or for a longer or a shorter time; but it shall be
competent for parties to contract for the payment and receipt of a rate of interest not exceeding
twelve dollars on the one hundred dollars for one year and not exceeding that rate for a greater or
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shroud of mystery veiling the fee structures in divorce-financing arrange-
ments makes it difficult to determine whether the rates charged are usuri-
ous. Yet, the 20 percent interest charged by a loan company such as BBL
Churchill92 or a return on investment approaching 33 percent93 is likely to be
viewed as unreasonable by a court or state law.94 Imposing more usury laws
and other such regulations capping rates, however, cannot stamp out the
conflicts of interest, privilege waiver, and moral questions that arise when
firms are involved.
Some may counter that financed clients are better off, despite the high
rates charged, because the nonmonied spouse ultimately gets more than she
could have without the means provided by a firm to pursue the divorce in
the first place.95 But nonmonied spouses should not have to pick between
the best of two evils—especially when courts have the authority and the
ability to properly deal with the disparity in financial power between two
spouses securing a divorce.96
C. High Rates Detract from Divorce Settlements
Perhaps the most worrisome part of third-party investments in divorce
is that, after a settlement is reached, the payment to the firm comes solely
from the nonmonied spouse’s portion of the settlement. There are three
typical financial consequences of a divorce: (1) spousal alimony (also re-
ferred to as maintenance), (2) awards of property, and (3) child support.97
less sum or for a longer or shorter time, in which case such rate exceeding seven dollars on one
hundred dollars shall be clearly expressed in writing.” (emphasis added)).
92. Mallon, supra note 2 (reporting that BBL Churchill typically collects between 12 and
20 percent interest on loans).
93. Telephone Interview with Stacey Napp, supra note 39. Ms. Napp would not explain
her sliding scale of how she charges clients but explained that when deciding her rates, the
closest model was personal injury, in which the rates are between 33 percent and 60 percent.
She said she never wants to take more than a client takes, because it is bad business for a client
to get less than the firm. She decided the rate had to be at least lower than 50 percent but the
goal is significantly lower than 33 percent. Ms. Napp’s contentions and reasoning about per-
sonal injury fees are simply false. Many states have a statutory cap on personal injury attor-
ney’s fees commonly set at one-third of the damages. E.g., Mich. Ct. R. 8.121(B) (West 2011)
(“The maximum allowable fee for [any claim or action for personal injury or wrongful death]
is one-third of the amount recovered.”).
94. In the personal injury context, an area of the law in which attorneys are frequently
paid on a contingency fee basis, the maximum fee that attorneys can charge is typically be-
tween 30 and 40 percent. E.g., Fla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) (allowing for
contingency fee payments in personal injury cases of up to 40 percent of any recovery, up to
$1,000,000).
95. Good Morning America: ‘Fairy Godmother’ ‘Levels’ Financial Playing Field for Divorces,
supra note 9 (statement of a BBL Churchill employee) (“It levels the playing field for our
clients . . . It gives them the ability to go into court, to not be backed into a settlement that is
less than what they deserve.”).
96. See infra Part III.
97. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1183 (1981).
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All of these awards are calculated, in part, based on a court’s careful deter-
mination of the nonmonied spouse’s need after the divorce is finalized.98
Payment to a financing firm, however, is sourced from at least one of the
nonmonied spouse’s awards rather than the joint marital assets (as would be
the case if the court required the monied spouse to pay the nonmonied
spouse’s fees).99 Payment of the return on investment depletes the much-
needed funds that a client receives.100 Regardless of which of these three
sources fund payments back to a firm, the ultimate payment is unnecessary
because courts can provide funding to nonmonied spouses directly, free of
any premium, by shifting fees.101
Property settlements are often the most substantial portion of a divorce
settlement and a client is likely to pay her lawyers and financing firm out of
these awards.102 State residency governs marital property during the mar-
riage and property division at divorce.103 All states adhere to either an equi-
table distribution regime104 or a community property regime,105 both of
which “lead to virtually indistinguishable results” with marital assets divided
roughly congruently.106 A financing firm’s involvement in a divorce, how-
ever, undermines this equitable division by increasing the number of people
who must share the nonmonied spouse’s property. A firm paid with a cli-
ent’s property award is taking away a valuable part of a client’s settlement.
Alimony payments are awarded to fulfill the needs of a former spouse
“who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employ-
ment.”107 Courts determine alimony based on a combination of theories,
including compensation for the spouse’s role in the marriage (based on the
duration of the marriage, among other factors), lifestyle expectations, and
the financial need of the former spouse.108
98. Id. at 1184 (“No-fault divorce laws have shifted the focus of the legal process from
moral questions of fault and responsibility to economic issues of ability to pay and financial
need.” (footnote omitted)).
99. See infra Section III.C.
100. Similar concerns animate the ban on contingency fees. See McInerney v. Massasoit
Greyhound Ass’n, 269 N.E.2d 211, 218 (Mass. 1971).
101. See infra Part III.
102. See Good Morning America: ‘Fairy Godmother’ ‘Levels’ Financial Playing Field for Di-
vorces, supra note 9 (“We get paid at the end of the day,” [a founder of BBL Churchill said].
“We get paid out of the sale of a property. We get paid out of a split in the IRA.”).
103. Abrams et al., supra note 80, at 471.
104. Id. at 474 (“ ‘Equitable distribution . . . entitl[es] each spouse to a fair share of the
property acquired during the marriage, regardless of how it is titled. . . .’ Today, 42 states and
the District of Columbia are equitable distribution jurisdictions at divorce, but apply title
theory during the course of the marriage.” (citation omitted) (quoting White v. White, 324
S.E.2d 829, 832 (N.C. 1985))).
105. Id. at 473 (“Under the [eight states with] community property regime[s], each
spouse has a present, vested one-half interest in all property acquired during the marriage.”).
106. Id. at 474. See generally Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 307 (amended 1973); Lee
R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4th 481 (1985).
107. Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 640 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
108. Abrams et al., supra note 80, at 551.
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A nonmonied spouse may use alimony to pay back an investment firm
in order to avoid having to sell her most valuable asset such as a home,109
but doing so undermines the purpose and policy underlying alimony. A cli-
ent receives inherently less than her court-determined need if she pays a firm
with alimony. This is especially problematic because the majority of firms’
clients are women, and “[j]udges systemically lowball property awards to
women[, while] [a]limony is based on judges’ subjective opinions and per-
sonal value judgments concerning what women should get, rather than on
what women deserve or need.”110 The imprecise and often subjective nature
of alimony awards increases the danger that a nonmonied spouse, living off
of already insufficient alimony payments,111 will be left with even less than
she needs when she uses these funds to pay back a firm. It is inequitable to
have individuals use court-awarded living expenses to repay firms, especially
when there are less costly alternatives such as fee shifting.
This risk of leaving a nonmonied spouse with inadequate funds is one of
the principal reasons that contingency fees are banned in the divorce con-
text. One court noted that contingency fees are disfavored in domestic rela-
tions cases because they “may deprive a spouse or child of a regulated stream
of funds carefully awarded by the court for support or living expenses; to
allow the scheduled payments to be bargained away in advance is against
public policy.”112
Payment of a firm’s fees from alimony can exacerbate the already diffi-
cult financial circumstances a client finds herself in post-divorce. Like con-
tingency fees, which are “an obstacle to the court’s duty to set up an
equitable property settlement as among the parties to the marriage and any
children,”113 these investments ultimately lead to an inequitable outcome.114
Merely informing courts of the use of firms so that courts may consider
109. See Winner, supra note 5, at 39.
110. Id. at 41.
111. See Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us
About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 41,
42–43 (2011) (“The terms ‘need,’ ‘ability,’ and ‘fair’ are highly subjective in this context. . . .
[S]ubjective standards and unpredictable results [typify] alimony disputes [in the United
States].”); Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?, Fam. Ad-
voc., Winter 2012, at 8, 9 (“The alimony provision of the UMDA provided that alimony could
be awarded only if the party seeking support ‘lacks sufficient property to provide for his rea-
sonable needs,’ and ‘is unable to support himself through appropriate employment.’ By
stressing that property division is the primary method of support, this language suggests that
support is not necessary where a reasonable amount of property is awarded to each spouse.
Moreover, the second prong of this test is vague on the most important point: the definition of
‘reasonable needs.’ One can reach very different figures for a spouse’s ‘needs,’ depending on
whether those needs are measured at a subsistence level, a level the court believes to be objec-
tively reasonable, or the actual subjective standard-of-living from the marriage.” (citation
omitted)).
112. In re Cooper, 344 S.E.2d 27, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
113. McInerney v. Massasoit Greyhound Ass’n, 269 N.E.2d 211, 218 (Mass. 1971).
114. See Arendell, supra note 5, at 12 (“High legal costs thus contributed greatly to the
economic hardship they experienced after divorce. In general, the more community property
there was, the higher the legal costs became. Legal fees were often paid out of a woman’s share
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repayment to the firm in the equation would be insufficient. Telling the
court at the end of the proceedings would not prevent the possible problems
between attorney and client from arising,115 and would not have the same
impact on preventing scorched-earth tactics.116 Courts are already prone to
give inadequate settlements117 and may not credit the need for the firm in
the first place as a legitimate cost.
Finally, a client in a desperate financial position may opt, impermissibly,
to use child support payments to cover payments to the firm. Child support
is governed by state law,118 and is granted based on the actual need of the
child and the ability of the parties to pay.119 Child support is intended to
fulfill, and must be rationally related to, the needs of the child, “taking into
account the lifestyle to which the child was accustomed and the standard of
living the child enjoyed before the divorce, and must reasonably relate to the
obligor’s ability to pay for those needs.”120 Any child support funds not used
to advance the interests of the child is an improper use of the funds. Third-
party funding of divorce can lead the nonmonied spouse, often the custodial
mother,121 to use child support funds to pay back the third-party financier.
This outcome also exacerbates resentments of child-support-paying parents,
many of whom already argue that funds are misused.122 Although the parent
would ultimately be responsible for an impermissible use of child support,
the existence of financing firms is one more weight that could tip the scale
and cause a parent to make this unfortunate choice.123
A firm’s services end up being more costly than is at first apparent. A
client who is funded by a firm may compromise the loyalty of her attorney,
waive the attorney-client privilege, and ultimately, after paying back the
firm, be left with less of the divorce settlement than she needs and deserves.
Putting courts in charge of equalizing fees captures the good aspects of the
of the community property settlement, which thus reduced her starting capital for life after
divorce.”).
115. See supra Section II.A.
116. See infra note 124 and accompanying text; infra Section III.D.
117. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2012) (laying out guidelines for state child support law).
119. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23(a) (West 2010).
120. 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 939 (2008).
121. See Timothy S. Grall, U.S. Census Bureau, Custodial Mothers and Fathers
and Their Child Support: 2009 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/p60-240.pdf (“[In 2009,] [a]bout 1 in 6 custodial parents were fathers . . . [and]
[o]ver half (60.3 percent) of custodial parents received some type of noncash support from
noncustodial parents on behalf of their children.”).
122. See, e.g., Jocelyn Elise Crowley, Defiant Dads: Fathers’ Rights Activists in
America 129 (2008). One father notes: “If they put together a system that this money is spent
on the children, I think most parents who are paying the child support wouldn’t have too
much of a problem. In my case, my main problem is my money is not spent on my children,
but is spent on other things.” Id.
123. The pressures created are much like those on the lawyer who impermissibly places a
financing firm’s interest ahead of the client’s. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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services provided by investment firms while eliminating all of the problems
identified in Part II. Admittedly, individual regulations could be deployed to
deal with specific concerns raised by third-party financing, but it would be
tedious to write one coherent law that could fix these issues. Regulation, as
discussed in the Introduction, also cannot deal with the exploitative nature
of this financing arrangement and the addition of a fifth entity with whom
the settlement must be split.
III. Courts Can and Should Shift Fees
Unlike firms, courts are neutral third parties with no financial stake in
divorces. A court can give a nonmonied spouse access to funding without
creating a conflict of interest, without waiving any privileges, and without
requiring the receiving spouse to bear the costs of the litigation all by herself.
Fee shifting may lead to the marital assets shrinking, resulting in a smaller
settlement for the nonmonied spouse; however, the nonmonied spouse will
be left with the entirety of her portion of the ultimate settlement and will
shoulder at most 50 percent of the costs instead of 100 percent as when she
must pay a firm back on her own. The shared interest in keeping fees low
also encourages cooperation and is likely to make the process more expedi-
tious given the financial stake in maintaining the marital assets.
Divorce can be a very contentious, drawn-out process. Some lawyers
“use so-called scorched earth tactics against wives in a campaign to wear
them down and starve them out. They attempt to outspend the wife by
legally obstructing the proceedings and delaying an agreement until she fi-
nally runs out of money and patience and gives up.”124 If costs are shared
with the monied spouse, dragging out the proceedings means shrinking the
pot that both spouses will share. The monied spouse knows that he is paying
for his spouse’s attorney’s fees and that the less the nonmonied spouse has
to spend on the litigation, the better it is for the monied spouse as there will
be more left over to split.
Most significantly, courts can shift fees in all cases, not only in divorces
involving large marital assets that draw the interest of firms chasing a profit.
Courts should always mandate shifting of fees—where the monied spouse
pays for the nonmonied spouse’s fees—when there is a demonstrated inabil-
ity by one party to pay for the costs of divorce.125 Doing so would obviate
the need for third-party financing of divorces.
Section III.A describes the mechanics of fee shifting by courts and ar-
gues that after finding a disparity in the financial positions of the spouses,
courts should order shifting of reasonable fees to the nonmonied spouse
from the monied spouse. Section III.B emphasizes that compared with pri-
vate firms, courts can help more individuals and are in a position to incen-
tivize both parties to settle quickly. Section III.C notes that when courts shift
fees the nonmonied spouse is guaranteed a fair proceeding and comparable
124. Winner, supra note 5, at 58.
125. See infra Section III.A.
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representation to the monied spouse. Section III.D underscores that fee
shifting leaves the nonmonied spouse with the entirety of her settlement,
and highlights the effect that fee shifting may have on the use of “scorched-
earth” tactics. The framework proposed is optimal because inability to pay
for a divorce is a problem that plagues many, not only spouses of wealthy
persons whom investment firms view as desirable clients. Court fee shifting
is favorable to any regulation and third-party financing as it stands because
it avoids the waiver issues, is cost-efficient, promotes quicker adjudication of
the divorce claims, and facilitates solving disparities in financial bargaining
power in a neutral, transparent forum.
A. The Mechanics of Fee Shifting
By shifting fees, courts have the ability to put spouses on equal footing
with respect to the financing of a divorce. In most states, courts have discre-
tion to award spouses reasonable fees.126 Courts weigh several factors in de-
termining whether a spouse has a demonstrated inability to pay for the costs
of divorce and should be awarded fees. For example, Illinois courts consider
the following:
(A) the income and property of each party . . . ;
(B) the needs of each party;
(C) the realistic earning capacity of each party;
(D) any impairment to the present earning capacity of either party . . . ;
(E) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(F) the degree of complexity of the issues . . . ;
(G) each party’s access to relevant information; [and]
(H) the amount of . . . payments made or reasonably expected to be made
to the attorney for the other party . . . .127
Every state, through common law, statute, or a combination, has rules
governing how courts should determine reasonable attorney’s fees. For ex-
ample, in New York, a party can move to receive attorney’s fees under New
York Domestic Relations Law Section 237.128
The parties must disclose the financial payments to and arrangements
with attorneys to the court.129 Since there is no formula for assessing reason-
ableness of an attorney’s fees, courts may consider several factors including
the following: “skill, time, and labor involved, the fee customarily charged in
126. E.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 2030 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); see also Andrea G. Nadel,
Annotation, Authority of Divorce Court to Award Prospective or Anticipated Attorneys’ Fees to
Enable Parties to Maintain or Defend Divorce Suit, 22 A.L.R. 4th 407 (1983) (“[A] trial court
may in its discretion order a party to pay prospective attorneys’ fees to enable the opposing
party to maintain or defend the action.”); Wenona Y. Whitfield, Where the Wind Blows: Fee
Shifting in Domestic Relations Cases, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 811, 813 (1987).
127. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/501(c-1)(1) (2012).
128. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 237 (McKinney 2010).
129. Id. (“Both parties to the action or proceeding and their respective attorneys, shall file
an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement between the party and the attor-
ney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing
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the locality for similar services in ‘high end’ divorce actions, the likelihood
that plaintiff’s counsel’s time commitment to this case precluded other em-
ployment, the amount in question and the results achieved, [and] the ex-
pense incurred.”130
Courts’ power to shift fees should be broadened and made mandatory.
Although some courts do not award enough,131 this is still a preferable ar-
rangement to the high rates that financing firms charge. Regardless of
whether a party moves for an award of fees, courts should always determine
whether fee shifting is necessary. Instead of attorneys needing to request
fees, the court should automatically inquire into need and mandatorily shift
fees when there is a demonstrated inability to pay.
B. Courts Fill a Tremendous Need by Shifting Fees
Obtaining a divorce can be extremely costly, especially when contested,
even for those without substantial assets who firms are not interested in
catering to.132 Firms investing in divorce are businesses and only take on
clients who are divorcing very wealthy spouses, a minute fraction of the
number of the nonmonied spouses who need financial help to pursue di-
vorces. Businesses are unlikely to finance a spouse seeking a divorce who has
little or no marital assets because investing in such a case would not be
lucrative. Courts on the other hand treat all divorce litigants the same, since
they have no stake in the financial assets at issue. Unlike firms, courts do not
have bottom lines and therefore can provide a service to the public by help-
ing nonmonied spouses finance their divorces. Fee shifting would thus be
more equitable for the entire range of nonmonied spouses.
C. Equalizing Fees Guarantees a Fair Adjudication and
Representation for Both Spouses
There is more transparency133 and the process is uninfected by the fi-
nancial interests of an unnecessary third party if courts deal with the fiscal
thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any
experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses.”).
130. Olson v. Olson, 671 N.W.2d 64, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
131. See, e.g., Jan Maiden, Comment, Winning by Financial Attrition: A Study of Attorney
Fees Under California Family Code Sections 2030 and 2032, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 311, 312–13
(2001) (“ ‘[D]espite Paula’s complete lack of resources and Kip’s stipulated ability to pay, the
trial court awarded her only $44,963.34 in fees and costs out of the total of $115,663.42 re-
quested.’ This amount was only thirty-nine percent of the actual fees and costs incurred by
Paula’s attorneys, or a payment the equivalent of only $65 per hour. In comparison, Kip paid
his attorneys $167,000, an average hourly rate of $219 per hour.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Petition for Review at 11, Ruisi v. Thieriot, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1197 (1997) (Nos. A071958,
A073925))).
132. See Laura Seldon, How Much Does the Average Divorce Really Cost?, Huffington
Post (May 30, 2013, 3:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/galtime/how-much-does-the-
average_b_3360433.html.
133. Records of court proceedings and filings allow for transparency and public access to
information regarding the details of divorces litigated in court.
May 2015] A Call for Court-Mandated Fee Shifting in Divorces 1293
disparities between spouses. This transparency can help prevent vulnerable,
sometimes unsophisticated, nonmonied spouses from being taken advantage
of and from making unfavorable tactical decisions such as waiving the attor-
ney-client privilege. In equalizing fees, courts must award reasonable fees to
the nonmonied spouse. Fees should be shifted in this way partly because the
assets from which the monied spouse pays may be joint marital assets, and
partly because both parties having proper representation is equitable.
By requiring the monied spouse to pay the fees of the nonmonied
spouse from the marital estate that they control when the divorce is pend-
ing, courts can ensure that both spouses receive legal guidance and can liti-
gate the divorce. “The adversary system presumes advocates of equal skill,
[who make] use of court procedures and sophisticated knowledge of law to
advance their clients’ interests.”134 Unfortunately, ability to pay largely dic-
tates how hard an attorney will work and what tools she will utilize in liti-
gating a case. “[H]aving clients with few financial assets prompts attorneys
to limit sharply what they do in the average case, while having clients with
deeper pockets encourages . . . increased use of the formal legal process.
Attorneys thus vary widely in their understanding of what constitutes ‘good
representation.’ ”135 While comparable counsel is not guaranteed even in
criminal cases, a system that aims to afford spouses similar representation is
a worthwhile endeavor. When courts shift fees, spouses have proper legal
guidance, are able to afford to litigate the divorce, and will not fall prey to
firms.
D. Equalizing Fees Leaves the Nonmonied Spouse with the Entirety of the
Ultimate Settlement and May Prevent the
Use of Scorched-Earth Tactics
The fees for the divorce costs for both spouses can be funded from the
marital estate.136 The nonmonied spouse is not indebted to anyone when
fees are shifted; the fees are covered with no strings attached. This is desira-
ble because it ensures that the nonmonied spouse will get what she and any
children involved need to move on after the divorce. Unlike when fees are
paid without court supervision, through fee shifting the court can require
both parties to detail attorneys’ hourly rates and time spent litigating the
divorce.137
Since the funding for both sides comes from the marital assets, the
wealthier party is incentivized not to drag out the proceedings and is unable
134. Mather et al., supra note 61, at 43.
135. Id. at 142.
136. See, e.g., 2 Timothy M. Tippins, New York Matrimonial Law and Practice
§ 17:35 (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2013) (“In order that the parties be on relatively equal footing,
the court may direct one party to contribute to the ‘war chest’ of the other so that each may be
championed by a well-trained legal gladiator.”).
137. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 237 (McKinney 2010).
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to deplete the marital assets only to fund his own legal costs.138 At the same
time, the nonmonied spouse has an equal incentive not to drag out litigation
because her settlement will be equally affected. Put simply, both parties are
interested in keeping fees low. Further, attorneys may not be as tempted to
drag out their representation as when a financial giant with deep pockets
such as a third-party financing firm is involved. Fee shifting may ultimately
impact the award given to the nonmonied spouse, but at least both parties
are equally sharing the burden of a costly divorce. Additionally, equalized
fees afford both parties comparable amounts of money to spend, so “starv-
ing out” the nonmonied spouse through protracted divorce litigation is less
feasible and would be the equivalent of self-starvation. The monied spouse
has no power to launch a war of financial attrition because both parties have
comparable spending power, until they both have nothing. In this way, the
two parties’ priorities are aligned: they both want the divorce finished
quickly and to preserve as much of the marital assets as possible.139
Conclusion
The recent wave of firms financing divorces is troublesome and creates
many costs that outweigh the possible benefits. Mandatory shifting of rea-
sonable fees by courts provides a workable and effective solution to deal
with some individuals’ inability to pay the costs of divorce that third-party
financiers purport to address. Fee shifting by courts prevents conflicts of
interest, waivers of the attorney-client privilege, and other problems that are
endemic in third-party financing of divorces.
Courts are able to help not only the wealthiest spouses seeking a divorce,
but anyone who demonstrates a need for help and has a spouse with enough
assets to cover her fees. Fee shifting by courts is transparent, attempts to
provide adequate representation for the nonmonied spouse, and com-
promises far less of the ultimate settlement that is desperately needed by the
nonmonied spouse.
Unlike regulation of firms, banning this practice outright prevents turn-
ing divorce into a source of profit on which businesses can capitalize, and
sends a powerful and important message to society: we will not permit big
business to exploit the vulnerabilities of people struggling through a divorce.
For these reasons, third-party financing of divorces should be banned and
displaced by the preferable, simpler solution of mandatory shifting of rea-
sonable fees by courts.
138. Sarah C. Acker, Note, All’s Fair in Love and Divorce: Why Divorce Attorney’s Fees
Should Constitute a Dissipation of Marital Assets in Order to Retain Equity in Marital Property
Distributions, 15 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 147, 164 (2006) (“When a spouse’s expen-
diture on attorney’s fees reduces the estate value, the expenditure inevitably reduces the
amount the other spouse can claim from the remaining estate.”).
139. This Note does not address possible situations in which a vindictive spouse (either
nonmonied or monied) wishes to prolong the proceedings despite the negative impact on her
own financial interests. Instead, this Note assumes that both parties are rational actors.
